Prioritizing Reform: The 10 Cabinet Departments with the Highest Share of Political Appointees

Campaign Briefing: Decoupling Partisan Politics from Governance

2028 Presidential Campaign of Martin A. Ginsburg, RN

October 21, 2025

I. INTRODUCTION: THE POLITICAL STABILITY ARGUMENT—BACKED BY STRUCTURE, NOT SENTIMENT

“When leadership is built on loyalty alone, stability crumbles with every election.”

While it has become widely accepted within this campaign and others aligned with institutional reform that fewer political appointees means more stable government, it is not enough to rest on intuition. This briefing documents why this is true, how it plays out structurally, and what consequences arise when political appointments dominate agency leadership. The departments most politically saturated are the most mission-fragile—and that correlation is neither accidental nor superficial.

II. WHAT WE MEAN BY STABILITY

Political stability in governance is not merely the absence of partisan disruption; it includes:

·         Continuity of operations regardless of election outcomes

·         Timely execution of statutory programs and services

·         Retention of institutional knowledge across leadership transitions

·         Legitimacy and credibility of nonpartisan service to the public

Each of these outcomes is best served by career executives with merit-based tenure, not by political appointees selected for loyalty or temporary alignment.

III. THE STRUCTURAL CASE: CIVIL SERVICE PROTECTIONS ENSURE STABILITY

Under Title 5 of the U.S. Code, career SES appointees are protected from politically motivated removals, arbitrary reassignment, or retaliation by new political leadership:

• Cannot be involuntarily reassigned for 120 days after the appointment of a new department head or noncareer supervisorGPO-PLUMBOOK-2024

• Must be removed only for cause, poor performance, or legal violation—not political disagreement

• Must be selected through competitive, merit-based procedures evaluated by a SES Qualifications Review Board (QRB)

By contrast, Schedule C, PA, and NA appointees:

• May be terminated at will

• Have no formal appeal rights

• Are ineligible for conversion to SES under current law.

Thus, a department heavily staffed with noncareer appointees is structurally more vulnerable to disruption, legal vacuums, and governance lapses.

IV. THE EMPIRICAL CASE: POLITICAL CHURN CAUSES DELAY, VACANCY, AND DYSFUNCTION

• As of 2022, the average Senate-confirmed PAS role took 9 to 14 months to fill, leading to gaps in mission continuity;

  • This vulnerability and slowing of departmental operations adversely impacting citizens is mitigated by professionals in leadership and managerial roles working to maintain governmental structure until new Senate confirmed top-level leadership is available to set the operational tone of the department.

• Departments like HHS, DHS, and Commerce experience up to 30% turnover in top positions per administration, slowing procurement, grant disbursement, and policy enforcement

• Schedule C and NA roles frequently remain vacant after leadership transitions due to confirmation gridlock, ethics vetting, or resignations;

  • These vacancies impede operations that are, by design, intended to work with and for citizens nationwide. This is not a benefit, but an impendement fo governmental service delivery.

• According to internal federal workforce stability models, an agency in which 40% or more of senior posts are politically appointed will experience:

  • Increased legal vulnerability in contract oversight

  • Decline in staff retention below the GS-13 level

  • Higher error rates in regulatory compliance and grant audit cycles

V. CASE STUDIES: WHERE POLITICAL DENSITY HAS DECREASED PERFORMANCE

1. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

• Over 340 political appointees in 2024

• Leadership turnover in ICE, FEMA, and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) every 2–3 years

  • Result: Major policy reversals on immigration enforcement, cyberattack response protocols, and border logistics—with cascading effects on state and local partners

• 2. Department of Education (ED)

• High concentration of political deputy and assistant secretaries

• Frequent leadership change at Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA) created delays in FAFSA disbursement and regulatory shifts in borrower relief

• SES leadership in parallel units (e.g., policy planning, internal audits) has ensured continuity in grant administration and Title IV compliance

• 3. Department of Commerce

• Political appointments dominate the Economic Development Administration (EDA) and International Trade Administration (ITA)

• Policy instability during administration changes weakens U.S. negotiation posture and disrupts public-private partnership frameworks

VI. POLICY REMEDY: REALIGNING APPOINTMENT STRUCTURE TO FUNCTION

Career SES roles are built to survive transitions. They are nonpartisan, continuity-focused, and insulated from electoral swings. When appointees are career:

• Agencies do not have to rebuild from scratch every 4 years

• Ongoing initiatives (e.g., enforcement policies, workforce training, interagency cybersecurity efforts) do not get delayed or politically restructured mid-cycle

• The professional core of government endures, even while the political direction shifts

Thus, fewer political appointees is not just a philosophical stance—it is a guarantee of operational resilience.

VII. IMPLEMENTATION FRAMEWORK

Action	Rationale	Expected Outcome
Reclassify management-level PAS to SES	Focus on operational, budget, technical roles	Reduce PAS vacancies; preserve leadership during transitions
Cap Schedule C density by department	Limit politically vulnerable slots	Institutionalize continuity and limit churn
Eliminate Schedule C appointments from the department	Not to limit, but to fully remove politically vulnerable roles that exist without Senate oversight or career vetting	Create a fully professionalized managerial tier; eliminate “at will” policy staff below PAS level
Expand SES pipelines through GS-15 promotions	Ensure qualified pool for career appointments	Strengthen internal culture of advancement and merit
Require 2:1 ratio of career to noncareer SES	Rebalance top leadership toward stability	Buffer against policy whiplash and abrupt realignments
Require 5:1 ratio of career to noncareer SES	Build structural majority of institutional expertise	Dramatically reduce political fragility while preserving policy latitude
Require 10:1 ratio of career to noncareer SES	Reserve only a minimal number of SES for political appointees in highly sensitive or visible roles	Make SES a career-based leadership model in practice, not just on paper

VIII. PROJECTED IMPACT OF IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES

Implementing these changes across departments—especially the ten with the highest political appointee concentration—will yield measurable and durable improvements in federal function. Below is a summary of projected system-wide benefits:

Reform Element	Institutional Impact
PAS-to-SES reclassification	Reduces nomination and confirmation backlog; enables smoother transition planning during presidential turnovers
Schedule C elimination	Ends political patronage in sub-PAS roles; shields day-to-day policy execution from disruption or partisan targeting
Expanded SES career pipelines	Bolsters internal morale and succession planning; reduces need to parachute in external hires unfamiliar with agency operations
Tighter SES career-to-noncareer ratios (5:1 to 10:1)	Increases management stability and continuity of expertise; lessens dependence on politically vulnerable personnel; sets national precedent for merit-based executive management

Combined, these reforms would prevent the loss of institutional memory every four to eight years, lower vacancy rates, reduce legal and administrative risk from poorly vetted appointees, and signal to Congress and the public that governance is increasingly based on capacity, not loyalty.

IX. CLOSING REMARKS

Our Vision and how, with the support of the Citizenry, we propose to accomplish our goals:

“Leadership in public service must be enduring, not episodic. Every position given to a career professional is a step toward a government built to outlast the next election.”

We reform not to restrict political choice—but to protect public service. These structural changes affirm that career civil servants, not campaign allies, should be the default stewards of essential government functions. Political appointees will still guide policy—but professionals will keep the lights on, the budgets running, the aid flowing, and the programs intact.

“We are not just reducing political appointments—we are replacing fragility with permanence. Our government cannot restart every election. With these reforms, it won’t have to.”

“When every leader changes, the mission falters. When professionals lead, the mission continues.”

The concentration of political appointees in Cabinet departments is not just a staffing model—it is a vulnerability. Reducing that concentration is an act of public protection. Every reform we propose begins with one premise: a government must be led by those who will remain long enough to see the job through.

“We will prioritize reform in those departments where politics overwhelms professionalism. The more career professionals we elevate, the more stable and effective our government becomes—for every administration to follow.”

“Every unnecessary political appointee is a gamble against government stability.”

“Departments saturated with political appointments become unstable, short-sighted, and slow. The most politically loaded departments also tend to be the most mission-critical. We cannot afford volatility in homeland security, healthcare, defense, or education.”

This campaign will target its first wave of restructuring where political appointees are most concentrated—and where reform will do the most good.

Closing Statement.

“The more political appointees an agency has, the more exposed it is to instability. That’s why our reforms will begin with the most politically overloaded departments—restoring professional governance where consistency matters most.”